Courts are being asked to decide vaccination issues between disagreeing parents in child custody cases . These disagreements are catching the public's eye and ears in the wake of the Disneyland measles outbreak, and the public opposition to mandatory vaccination by prominent or at least visible people, who are mostly not scientists.
If you have parenting or custody issues connected with medical treatment of your child, GSLO has experience in addressing these disputes promptly, sensitively, and discreetly.
Acknowledgment for the pointer, as usual, to Eugene Volokh.
Showing posts with label Gould-Saltman Law Offices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gould-Saltman Law Offices. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Spend More Time talking About The Relationship, and Less Money on the Ring, the Wedding (and the Divorce?)
An Emory University study suggests that there is an inverse correlation between the amount a couple spends on the engagement ring and the wedding, and the chance that the marriage will last. I have my own theories about why this correlation may exist, but it does re-emphasize my "sermon" about pre-marital planning. While sitting down and talking about what you intend in the marriage, financially, emotionally, and spiritually, isn't as romantic as picking a ring, or a wedding venue, it's a lot more critical to your long-term marital happiness.
Friday, August 15, 2014
Child Custody And Religion (Again): What Should Happen When One Parent Converts?
We've got another child custody and religion case from New York, about, at least ostensibly, what should happen when one parent, but not the other, decides to "change horses mid-stream" in terms of the child's religious upbringing.
A closer reading of the facts suggests that other facts played a much greater role in the decision than the religion issue did, and that the judge may have used the religion issue as a tie-breaker as between two fairly horrendous-sounding parents, to decide who was the "least bad" parent.
The interesting question, when the hard facts are stripped away, however, is the extent to which a general presumption that "stability" is good for kids, (and good for kids of divorcing parents, and good for kids of high-conflict divorcing parents) should weigh against the right of parents, under the First Amendment, to change religions, if they want, as frequently as they change their socks.
A (waterproof) hat tip to Doc Volokh at UCLA, with hopes that they get the campus dried back out before Fall Semester.
P.S.: ...and this just in from Florida, again by way of Volokh:
a trial judge who restrained a Jehovah's Witness non-custodial father from doing "...anything in front of the children or around the children...” that “...conflicts with the Catholic religion...." (practiced by custodial mom) was reversed, the appeals court noting: "While the mother’s concern that exposure to two different religions could confuse the children may be reasonable, neither that concern nor the evidence presented below established the requisite showing of harm to grant the mother ultimate religious decision-making authority for the children and to restrict the father..."
A closer reading of the facts suggests that other facts played a much greater role in the decision than the religion issue did, and that the judge may have used the religion issue as a tie-breaker as between two fairly horrendous-sounding parents, to decide who was the "least bad" parent.
The interesting question, when the hard facts are stripped away, however, is the extent to which a general presumption that "stability" is good for kids, (and good for kids of divorcing parents, and good for kids of high-conflict divorcing parents) should weigh against the right of parents, under the First Amendment, to change religions, if they want, as frequently as they change their socks.
A (waterproof) hat tip to Doc Volokh at UCLA, with hopes that they get the campus dried back out before Fall Semester.
P.S.: ...and this just in from Florida, again by way of Volokh:
a trial judge who restrained a Jehovah's Witness non-custodial father from doing "...anything in front of the children or around the children...” that “...conflicts with the Catholic religion...." (practiced by custodial mom) was reversed, the appeals court noting: "While the mother’s concern that exposure to two different religions could confuse the children may be reasonable, neither that concern nor the evidence presented below established the requisite showing of harm to grant the mother ultimate religious decision-making authority for the children and to restrict the father..."
Thursday, June 19, 2014
International Child Custody and Child Abduction: Who Are The "Good Guy" and "Bad Guy" Countries? The Most Recent Hague Convention Report
The most recent State Department Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction shows that even those countries which have signed off on the Convention do not always comply with it. Even Western Hemisphere countries, including Costa
Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, are inconsistent in their compliance. If you're in a dispute over the custody of your children, and the other parent proposes to travel out of the U.S., you should consult an experienced custody attorney in advance; in this situation, an ounce of prevention may be far less expensive, and better than a ton of cure. A hat tip to international custody guru Jeremy Morley for the pointer.
Monday, March 31, 2014
"Domestic Violence" and "Disturbing The Peace": How Should They Be Defined?
California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“the DVPA”) was intended to streamline and simplify the process of protecting victims, including children, from familial abuse. Two recent cases have blurred the definition of “domestic violence” to a point where it is now difficult even for experienced lawyers to predict, in a given case, whether particular conduct rises to the level at which a particular judge, on a particular day, will issue a permanent restraining order. Since DVPA restraining orders have serious long-term consequences to the rights of the person at the “business end” *, particularly in any case involving children, this is a far from trivial concern.
The problems start with a circular legal definition: California Family Code (“FC”) Section 6203 defines “abuse” as:
(1) "... causing or attempting to cause bodily injury";
(2) sexual assault,
(3) "placing a person in ... ...apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury..."
or
(4) (and here’s the problem) engaging in “...in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to FC 6320".
FC 6320, in turn, allows the court to "enjoin" any of the following: molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, (including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls) ... ...destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and ... ... of other named family or household members” and may “include in a protective order a grant of the exclusive ... ...possession... ...of any animal .... The court may order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”
So if a judge finds that the person to be (but not yet) restrained did any of those things which the court could have restrained, then it appears that the judge may be required to issue the both he temporary and permanent restraining order.
The recent Court of Appeal opinion in Burquet/Brumbaugh**, echoing the earlier opinion in Marriage of Nadkarni***, expands the applied definition of “disturb the peace” . In Nadkarni, the appellate court said:
We believe that the Legislature intended that the DVPA be broadly construed in order to accomplish the purpose of the DVPA. Therefore, the plain meaning of the phrase "disturbing the peace" ... ... may include... ... a former husband's alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his former wife by accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails. .... Datta's conduct included accessing, reading, and • publicly disclosing the content of Darshana's confidential e-mails, and that his conduct caused her to suffer "shock" and "embarrassment," to fear the destruction of her "business relationships," and to fear for her safety. In other words, Datta's conduct with respect to Darshana's e-mail account, as stated in her declaration, allegedly caused the destruction of her mental or emotional calm...
The court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s refusal to grant a restraining order.
In Burquet, the appellate court affirmed trial court’s granting of a permanent restraining order, on a showing that “defendant, because of his inability to accept that his romantic relationship with the plaintiff was over, and despite plaintiff’s numerous requests that he not contact her, was engaging in a course of conduct of contacting plaintiff by phone, email, and text, which messages contained inappropriate sexual innuendos, and arriving at her residence unannounced and uninvited, and then refusing to leave and making a scene, when she refused to see him for the purpose of causing her to renew their romantic relationship.” **** There was no showing that Brumbaugh had ever threatened anyone, or attempted to enter Ms. Burquet’s residence over her objection (in fact, he left the scene voluntarily).
What is problematic about these cases is the reliance on the parties’ past emotional history in determining what does or doesn’t constitute “abuse” which results in the issuance of a restraining order; effectively, the past emotional relationship of the parties may convert otherwise “non-abusive” conduct into conduct upon which a court can base a permanent restraining order.
When a legal process requires judges to perform this sort of psychoanalysis, in a short hearing between (generally) unrepresented litigants, on a crowded calendar, while attempting to prevent recurrence of true domestic abuse and violence, we have a problem.
* These consequences can include a permanent, “un-expungible” record of the issuance of a temporary order, even if the court later finds that there is no basis for issuing a permanent order, which record will affect any sort of application which requires a background check or disclosure; a presumption that the restrained person should not be awarded sole or joint custody of any child, deprivation of the right to possess a firearm, even in the course of one’s job, and other serious, long-term consequences. See Shebby, D. “Hey Joe, Where You Going With That Gun: Do The Automatic Firearms Restrictions In California DVPA Orders Conflict With The Second Amendment”, ACFLS Family Law Specialist 2013:3 p. 1.
**B248031 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BQ039688 Filed 1/14/14; pub. order 2/11/14.
***IRMO Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483
**** ”“He knocked on the door and plaintiff opened it but did not invite him inside. After a short conversation she told him to respect her wishes and to leave. ‘He got angry. He started saying very—in a loud voice “I love you, I don’t know, I’m sorry.’” She was afraid of what he was going to do, and said ‘Please leave, I’m scared. I will call the police.’ ‘And that’s when he shouted at me through my door window, I want to see you do that.’ Defendant still did not leave, he paced around her porch for about 10 minutes. After about ten minutes he called her from his cell phone and told her he was leaving. He asked her not to be scared, but she was scared because he was angry. On two prior occasions during their relationship when he had gotten angry he became physical with her. He left before the police arrived.”
The problems start with a circular legal definition: California Family Code (“FC”) Section 6203 defines “abuse” as:
(1) "... causing or attempting to cause bodily injury";
(2) sexual assault,
(3) "placing a person in ... ...apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury..."
or
(4) (and here’s the problem) engaging in “...in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to FC 6320".
FC 6320, in turn, allows the court to "enjoin" any of the following: molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, (including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls) ... ...destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and ... ... of other named family or household members” and may “include in a protective order a grant of the exclusive ... ...possession... ...of any animal .... The court may order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”
So if a judge finds that the person to be (but not yet) restrained did any of those things which the court could have restrained, then it appears that the judge may be required to issue the both he temporary and permanent restraining order.
The recent Court of Appeal opinion in Burquet/Brumbaugh**, echoing the earlier opinion in Marriage of Nadkarni***, expands the applied definition of “disturb the peace” . In Nadkarni, the appellate court said:
We believe that the Legislature intended that the DVPA be broadly construed in order to accomplish the purpose of the DVPA. Therefore, the plain meaning of the phrase "disturbing the peace" ... ... may include... ... a former husband's alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his former wife by accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails. .... Datta's conduct included accessing, reading, and • publicly disclosing the content of Darshana's confidential e-mails, and that his conduct caused her to suffer "shock" and "embarrassment," to fear the destruction of her "business relationships," and to fear for her safety. In other words, Datta's conduct with respect to Darshana's e-mail account, as stated in her declaration, allegedly caused the destruction of her mental or emotional calm...
The court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s refusal to grant a restraining order.
In Burquet, the appellate court affirmed trial court’s granting of a permanent restraining order, on a showing that “defendant, because of his inability to accept that his romantic relationship with the plaintiff was over, and despite plaintiff’s numerous requests that he not contact her, was engaging in a course of conduct of contacting plaintiff by phone, email, and text, which messages contained inappropriate sexual innuendos, and arriving at her residence unannounced and uninvited, and then refusing to leave and making a scene, when she refused to see him for the purpose of causing her to renew their romantic relationship.” **** There was no showing that Brumbaugh had ever threatened anyone, or attempted to enter Ms. Burquet’s residence over her objection (in fact, he left the scene voluntarily).
What is problematic about these cases is the reliance on the parties’ past emotional history in determining what does or doesn’t constitute “abuse” which results in the issuance of a restraining order; effectively, the past emotional relationship of the parties may convert otherwise “non-abusive” conduct into conduct upon which a court can base a permanent restraining order.
When a legal process requires judges to perform this sort of psychoanalysis, in a short hearing between (generally) unrepresented litigants, on a crowded calendar, while attempting to prevent recurrence of true domestic abuse and violence, we have a problem.
* These consequences can include a permanent, “un-expungible” record of the issuance of a temporary order, even if the court later finds that there is no basis for issuing a permanent order, which record will affect any sort of application which requires a background check or disclosure; a presumption that the restrained person should not be awarded sole or joint custody of any child, deprivation of the right to possess a firearm, even in the course of one’s job, and other serious, long-term consequences. See Shebby, D. “Hey Joe, Where You Going With That Gun: Do The Automatic Firearms Restrictions In California DVPA Orders Conflict With The Second Amendment”, ACFLS Family Law Specialist 2013:3 p. 1.
**B248031 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BQ039688 Filed 1/14/14; pub. order 2/11/14.
***IRMO Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483
**** ”“He knocked on the door and plaintiff opened it but did not invite him inside. After a short conversation she told him to respect her wishes and to leave. ‘He got angry. He started saying very—in a loud voice “I love you, I don’t know, I’m sorry.’” She was afraid of what he was going to do, and said ‘Please leave, I’m scared. I will call the police.’ ‘And that’s when he shouted at me through my door window, I want to see you do that.’ Defendant still did not leave, he paced around her porch for about 10 minutes. After about ten minutes he called her from his cell phone and told her he was leaving. He asked her not to be scared, but she was scared because he was angry. On two prior occasions during their relationship when he had gotten angry he became physical with her. He left before the police arrived.”
Monday, March 10, 2014
Family Law And Religion, Again
The first defendant has entered a Federal guilty plea in the "extort a divorce" ("get a get"?) case in New York. David Hellman, a New York personal trainer, succumbed to a Federal sting operation, and traveled across a state line (or more specifically, across the GW bridge) to meet with some co-conspirators, and an FBI undercover agent, posing as the brother of a soon-to-be-ex-wife who needed her soon-to-be-ex-husband "convinced" to grant her a get, a religious divorce.
A tip o' the kippah to Howard Friedman at Religion Clause.
A tip o' the kippah to Howard Friedman at Religion Clause.
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Decision From SCOTUS Regarding Hague Convention
(yes, the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, NOT the one about dropping bombs from Zeppelins): Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, stating that the one year "statute of limitation" within which the courts of a country to which a child has been abducted (or, in the language of the statute, "removed") must order a child "returned" to the original place of residence is not extended if the child is concealed.
Thursday, January 30, 2014
Are "Friends" Friends? Social Media and Law
Is being a Facebook "friend" of the judge, the same as being "friends with the judge"? Florida seems unsure, and blawger Ilya Somin has some additional thoughts on Florida's view. As someone who's friends, and "friends", with a judge (I'm also married to her), it's of some interest. A tip of the mortarboard, per usual, to Prof. Volokh, now over on the Washington Post's platform.
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
Wednesday, October 2, 2013
Parents: your legal guide to Kids and The Law: (free from the California State Bar!)
Just in time for school! Here it is!
Thursday, August 29, 2013
Same-Sex Marriage Tax Problems (Partially) Eliminated
The President has announced that the Treasury Department will give Federal recognition to same-sex marriages for tax purposes. It's unclear whether this decision will apply to "civil unions", "registered domestic partnerships", etc. Stay tuned...
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Can You Kiss Your Cousin?
A recent Slate advice column inquiry about the impending marriage of two people who are cousins, but don't know it, has led to a fascinating discussion over at Volokh Conspiracy about the circumstances under which such a marriage might, or might not be legal.
A tip of the late August panama hat (supplied by Meyer the Hatter of New Orleans) to Doc Volokh.
A tip of the late August panama hat (supplied by Meyer the Hatter of New Orleans) to Doc Volokh.
Friday, August 2, 2013
Hot Mid-Summer Action! (or something like it)
Custody and Dollars
In a somewhat troubling decision, the Illinois Appellate Court has reversed a trial court and ordered that a "move-away" be permitted, where the finding that re-location was in the child's best interest was built on the economic benefit Mom (the moving parent) would receive when she married her fiance.
L.C. has two parents who are too poor to support him. His mother, a part-time waitress, receives child support in the amount of $67 bimonthly from his father, who, it appears, lives in a basement room of his mother’s and stepfather’s house. We hasten to add that there is no correlation between money and human worth and that we do not intend the least denigration of either parent. Nevertheless, such economic hardship is not to be taken lightly. Poverty can be grim and corrosive, and social mobility in the United States is not what it used to be. We do not mean to subscribe to an iron-clad determinism, but the opportunities L.C. has during his childhood probably will determine the opportunities he has for the rest of his life.
.....
All in all, it strikes us as unfair to L.C. to jeopardize his good fortune by diminishing the means by which [would-be step-father] can help him materially.
Since Illinois applies a substantially higher threshold requirement in out-of-state relocation cases for the "moving away" parent than California applies, it's not clear that the result would have ultimately have been different in California. The "economic realities" of the case were such, however, as to demand that the court disclaim doing exactly what they were, ultimately, doing, which was tying the court's custody decision to the as-yet-unrealized marriageability of Mom.
Same-Sex Marriage Dust-Up Continues
Meanwhile, the dust on same-sex marriage continues to swirl around local courthouses, and city halls (or wherever they issue marriage licenses these days). An Ohio Federal court seems poised to determine that whether or not Ohio is required to provide same-sex marriage, it cannot refuse to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in states in which such marriages are authorized, and in Kentucky Federal court, a suit has now been filed by a pair of same-sex spouses and adoptive parents, challenging that state's refusal to recognize the marriage, and to permit the Kentucky adoption to proceed as an adoption by a married couple.
Wednesday, May 8, 2013
Monday, April 29, 2013
Wednesday, January 2, 2013
Same-Sex Marriage/Partnerships in Scotland?
There's a bill pending. Thanks and a tip of the tam o' shanter (or is it a kippeh?) to Howard Friedman at Religion Clause.
Friday, August 3, 2012
Pre-Nuptial Agreements In India
While "pre-nups" are apparently becoming more popular between Indian couples, their validity is still unclear.
Thanks and a tip of the Summertime seagrass fedora to Jeremy Morley's International Family Law.
Thanks and a tip of the Summertime seagrass fedora to Jeremy Morley's International Family Law.
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
I'll have some year-end thoughts
...after a somewhat more exciting year than I really needed... watch this space....
Monday, October 17, 2011
Monday, December 20, 2010
French Civil Unions: "Marriage Lite"?
There's a reported substantial upswing, in France, of young opposite-sex couples electing to contract "civil unions" instead of marrying. The French 1999 "pacte civil de solidarité" ("civil union") statute was apparently originally enacted, (as with the "civil union" and "domestic partnership" laws of several American states), as a"sort-of-marriage" for same-sex couples, but, as the New York Times reports, as of last year, 95% of the civil unions contracted in France were between mixed-sex couples.
P.S.: My thought, two months after I originally posted this, is that I'd like to know what happened to the marriage rate for the mixed-sex couples of the same age group during this period. Is it possible that having this option available for mixed-sex couples who were reluctant to marry, as the anecdotes suggest, actually increased the number of mixed-sex couples who were willing to make some sort of formal commitment?
P.S.: My thought, two months after I originally posted this, is that I'd like to know what happened to the marriage rate for the mixed-sex couples of the same age group during this period. Is it possible that having this option available for mixed-sex couples who were reluctant to marry, as the anecdotes suggest, actually increased the number of mixed-sex couples who were willing to make some sort of formal commitment?
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